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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
not redeemed. 16 The certificate in itself does not convey title to the pur-
chaser, and on this basis it is difficult to understand why the purchaser
should be protected against unrecorded interests.
The dissent as expressed by Chief Justice Schaefer points out that the
result of the holding is that there is no one who can redeem from the tax
sale involved in this litigation. The Chief Justice also mentions what he
considers to be the unsoundness of the proposition set forth that redemp-
tion can only be effected by those whose interests were actually or con-
structively known to the purchaser at the time of the tax sale.
Future decisions will have to clarify just how far recording of a deed
is a sine qua non of redemption. Would, for example, one who acquired
title to property by adverse possession but whose interest was not recorded
or known to the purchaser at the time of the tax sale be allowed to re-
deem? The statutes hold that "persons interested" and "unknown own-
ers" may redeem. It must be left to future cases to determine how there
can be rights of "unknown owners" if it is required that their interest be
recorded in order to have any effect as against the purchaser at the tax
sale.
16 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wabash Randolph Corp., 388 Il. 376, 57 N.E.2d 881
(1944).
SCAFFOLD ACT-CONTROL OF CONSTRUCTION AS
A REQUISITE OF LIABILITY
John Gannon, the plaintiff, was employed by an independent contrac-
tor as a bricklayer. The contractor was engaged in rebuilding a freight
dock pursuant to a contract entered into with the defendant-owner. All
construction, including scaffold erection, was done by the contractor.
Although the defendant's architects made frequent inspections of the
building activity to see that the work conformed to specifications pre-
pared by them, they neither inspected the scaffold erection nor exercised
control over the manner in which the work was done. In the course of
his employment, the plaintiff ascended a ladder which was in place against
a portion of scaffolding. As he was about to step onto the scaffold, the
ladder slipped out from under him causing him to fall to the floor. No
employee of the defendant was present at the scene when the accident
occurred; further, there was no evidence of any defect in the scaffold or
ladder other than the fact that the ladder was not nailed to the scaffold
as was customary in the trade. Suit was brought by the plaintiff, under
the civil liability provisions of the Structural Work Act, to recover
damages from the defendant-owner for personal injuries sustained as a
result of his fall. A judgment for the plaintiff was subsequently reversed
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in the Appellate Court on the grounds that the instructions failed to in-
clude, "the clear statutory mandate that liability is to be imposed only
upon persons 'having charge of' the erection,"' and were therefore preju-
dicial to the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in a
five to two opinion, affirmed the Apellate Court's decision and remanded
with directions. Gannon v. Chicago, M., St.P. & P. Ry., 22 Ill. 2d 305,
175 N.E. 2d 785 (1961).
In an attempt to remedy the injustices2 which accrued to employees
engaged in structural work upon their being injured as a result of, or in
the course of employment, the Illinois legislature, in 1907, enacted the
Structural Work Act,3 commonly called the Scaffold Act. The purpose
of the act was to reduce the hazard of work to the fullest possible extent
by requiring structural work equipment, such as scaffolds, to be erected
in a safe, suitable and proper manner. These standards were maintained
by imposing civil and criminal liability upon the owner, contractor or
other person in charge of the erection or construction, for any injury to
person or property occasioned by any wilful violations of the act or wil-
ful failures to comply with any of its provisions.4 The act greatly bene-
fited injured workmen inasmuch as it aided them in maintaining actions
against employers or other persons in charge of the work, by providing
a statutory standard of conduct not subject to the common law defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.5 However, as a result
of passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act 6 in 1911, common law
actions by an injured employee against his employer were barred. That
act also barred, by virtue of section 29,7 actions by employees against
third party tortfeasors. Since structural workers came under the act, these
bars had the effect of limiting the use of the Scaffold Act as a civil rem-
edy.8 Recently, however, section 29 has been declared unconstitutional,9
and the civil liability provisions of the Scaffold Act are frequently in-
voked.' 0
1 Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 25 111. App.2d 272, 284, 167 N.E.2d 5, 11
(1960).
2Estimated percentage of non-compensable personal injuries suffered in industry
at that time: 70%, 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 1 (2d ed. 1932); 80%,
Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n. v. Behnken, 226 S.W. 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
3 ILL. LAWS 1907, at 312.
4 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 §§ 60-69 (1959).
5 Schultz v. Ericsson, 264 111. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914).
6 111. Laws 1911, at 315.
7 Ill. Laws 1911, at 359.
8 Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 22 Ill.2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
9 Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 11. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
10 Observe that the Scaffold Act, since enacted prior to the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, was not intended to provide an additional remedy.
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At the time of the decision of the Gannon case," the law was unsettled
as to the liability of an owner under section 9 of the Scaffold Act.12 The
Gannon court, recognizing that there was no unanimity as to the meaning
of the language in the act, or as to the scope of the decisions construing
it, considered both the statutory history and the objectives which the
legislature sought to attain by passage of the act, before rendering its
decision. In determining legislative intent, it looked not only at the lan-
guage of the act, but at the evils which it sought to remedy.' 3 The issue
in the Gannon case was the nature of the owner's liability under section
9.14 The court was thus confronted with two recent Illinois cases involv-
ing the same issue, but which rendered decisions as to the liability of the
owner that were diametrically opposed to one another. The first case,
Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co.,15 held that the owner has an independent and
non-delegable duty of compliance under the act, irrespective of control
over the scaffold erection. Opposed to that view, is the opinion of the
Appellate Court 6 from which the plaintiff in Gannon appealed. It held
that the owner is liable under section 9, only if he is proven to be in charge
of the work and wilfully violates the act. To better understand the logic
employed by the Gannon court in evaluating the relative merits of the
two interpretations of the owner's liability, it is necessary to examine the
cases and the socio-legal climate which constitute the statutory history
of the Scaffold Act.
The question of civil liability of an owner under section 9 was never
unequivocally interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court until the Ken-
11 The provisions of the Scaffold Act essential to an understanding of the Gannon
case are set forth herein: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 §§ 60-69 (1959).
Section 1-"al scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders,... erected ... by any person,
firm or corporation in this state for the use of erection, repairing, alterations, re-
moval or painting of any... building.. . shall be erected in a safe suitable and proper
manner and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper
and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or
engaged thereon.. .."
Section 9-"Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having
charge of the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal, or painting of any
building ... or other structure within the provisions of this act shall comply with all
the terms thereof and any such owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other
person violating any of the provisions of this act shall. .. be fined ... or imprisoned.
For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violations of this
act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue
to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby."
12 Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 22 III.2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
1a Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 13 ll.2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1958).
16 Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 25 Ill.App.2d 272, 167 N.E.2d 5 (1960).
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nerly case.17 However, just two years prior to Kennerly, the Appellate
Court in Taber v. Defenbaugb,18 a case involving a factual situation simi-
lar to the one in Kennerly, refused to impose liability upon the owner
without proof that he actually was in charge of the construction. In the
Kennerly case, an employee'of an independent contractor sued the owner
of the premises under section 9 of the Scaffold Act for injuries sustained
as a result of a fall from a scaffold constructed by employees of the con-
tractor. In rejecting the defendant's contention that the act imposes liabil-
ity only on the person "having charge of" the work, the court said that,
"[T]he Scaffold Act deals with highly dangerous activities. It has been
regarded from the outset to fix an independent, non-delegable duty of
compliance upon the owner of property and upon each contractor and
sub-contractor engaged in the work. Neither this court nor the Appellate
Court has deviated from this construction of the statute, first announced
almost fifty years ago."' 9 To support its position that there was, "a long
history of interpretation that refutes the defendant's position," 20 the Court
cited two Illinois Supreme Court decisions as authority.
The first of these was Claffy v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co. 21 In that
case, an employee of an independent contractor fell down an unguarded
elevator shaft and brought an action against the owner of the building
under section 722 of the act. That section is distinguished from section 9
by the absence of the words "having charge of" after the word "owner."
Not only was the case concerned with a different section of the act, but
under the facts of the Claffy case, "the owner never parted with the
control and supervision of the building. . ".. ,,2- Thus it is evident, that the
statements made in Claffy to the effect that control is not a necessary
element in determining the liability of an owner under section 9 are mere
dictum and should not be relied upon in subsequent proceedings as author-
ity.24 The fact that the Claffy case only construed the language of section
7 and not that of section 9 was recognized by the Appellate Court in
Mindrop v. Gage,25 which involved liability under section 9 for the im-
17 Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 ll.2d 431,150 N.E.2d 134 (1958).
18 9 11l. App.2d 169, 132 N.E.2d 454 (1956).
19 Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 IU.2d 431,435, 150 N.E.2d 134, 137 (1958).
20 Id. at 434, 150 N.E.2d at 136; Contra, Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 22
111.2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961), where the court finds no such settled course of case
law.
21 249 Ill. 210, 94 N.E. 551 (1911).
22 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 S 67 (1959).
23 Claffy v. Chicago Dock Co., 249 111. 210, 222, 94 N.E. 551, 555 (1911).
24 Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 111.2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1938) (dissenting opinion).
25 189 Ill. App. 599 (1914).
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proper operation of a derrick. The court, as reported in abstract, held
that, "[T]he statute concerning structural work . . does not operate to
impose a . . . duty on all persons connected with a given structural con-
struction, and belonging to any one of the classes named, irrespective of
their having control or 'charge' of the work. ' 26 The distinction in lan-
guage between section 7 and section 9 was again emphasized in Breton
v. Levinson,2 T where the court held that the duty to comply with the
terms of the act is to be placed only upon those actually constructing the
scaffold, and not upon the owner where he does not have charge of the
scaffold erection.
The second case relied on by the Kennerly court is John Griffiths &
Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co. 28 In that case, the court said that
the "act of 1907 imposes upon the contractor and the owner, as well as
upon . . . others engaged in the work, the duty of complying with the
... act so far as civil liability is concerned. 29 This, and similar statements,
are cited as being controlling upon the issue by the Kennerly court.30
But, as plainly stated in Griffiths, the validity of an indemnity agreement
was the only issue involved.31 Therefore, the language with which the
court commented upon the owner's liability under the act was dictum,
and therefore not necessary to the decision.32 It follows that the Griffitbs
case is not of any value as precedent in the Kennerly case.33
A federal court case, Schmid v. United States,34 pointed out that the
Griffiths case was not authority in determining the liability of an owner
under section 9, and further stated that the act designates the persons who
are to be held liable in the "disjunctive" rather than the "conjunctive"
and includes the words "having charge of" which were obviously not
intended to be idle.35 The court emphasized repeatedly, that under the
language of the act, the owner's liability, as well as the liability of the
other individuals enumerated in section 9, is predicated upon proof of
control over the work being done.36 That the purpose of the act is to
26 Id. at 603.
27207 Il. App. 406 (1917).
28 310111. 331,141 N.E. 739 (1923).
29 Id. at 335, 141 N.E. at 740.
30 Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 I11.2d 431,150 N.E.2d 134 (1958).
31John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 11. 331, 141 N.E. 739
(1923).
32 Schmid v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Ill. 1957); Village of Lombard v.
Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 405 111. 209, 90 N.E.2d 105 (1950).
33 Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 22 Ill.2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961).




hold liable any of the enumerated persons who are in charge of the work
and not to hold the owner liable without proof of his having control
of the project was the interpretation given by the act by the Scbmid
court. Although convinced that the correct interpretation of the act re-
quired an owner to be in charge of the work in order to be liable, the
court was forced to render final judgment contrary to its analysis because
of the Kennerly case, which had been decided prior to a rehearing in the
Scbmid case, under the principle that federal courts are bound to follow
the law as interpreted by the highest court of a state.3 7
From the analysis of case law, it is apparent that the law in Illinois, until
the Kennerly case in 1958, was clearly that in order for an owner to be
liable under section 9 of the Scaffold Act, it was necessary that he be
proven to have been in charge of the work.3 Subsequent to the Kennerly
case, however, in a number of appellate and federal court cases,39 the
owner was held liable regardless of control over work being done on his
premises. However, thus to interpret the statute would be to hold that
every enumerated person in section 9, in addition to his regular duties
of employment, has a duty to see that every other enumerated person
complies with the act, or sustain liability.
The decision in Kennerly was not followed by the Appellate Court 40
in the Gannon case. The court held that the Kennerly decision did not
reflect the intention of the legislature. The court stated that, "[I]f the
legislature had wanted to make all owners liable, whether they had charge
of the work or not, it would have been a simple matter-and certainly the
logical solution-to omit the qualifying phrase 'having charge of' . ... ,,41
Thus it is apparent that to hold the owner liable when he is not in charge
of the work is to extend his liability beyond the scope that the legislature
originally intended. The court added that, "[U]nder the clear and un-
ambiguous language of the statute liability is imposed on the owner where
the owner (1) is in charge of the erection of a building and (2) wilfully
violates the act."'42
The plaintiff contended, in both the Appellate and Supreme Court,
37 Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1960).
38 Schmid v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Ill. 1957); Taber v. Defenbaugh,
9 Ill. App.2d 169, 132 N.E.2d 454 (1956); Breton v. Levinson, 207 Ill. App. 406 (1917);
Mindrop v. Gage, 189 Ill. App. 599 (1914).
39 Bounougias v. Republic Steel Corp., 277 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1960); Schmid v.
United States, 273 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1960); Pankey v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 167
F. Supp. 609 (S.D. IMl. 1958); Moroni v. Intrusion Prepakt Inc., 24 Ill. App.2d 534, 165
N.E.2d 346 (1960).
4 0 Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 25 Il. App.2d 272, 167 N.E.2d 5 (1960).
41 Id. at 279, 167 N.E.2d at 8.
42 Id. at 277, 167 N.E.2d at 7.
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that the owner's duty is independent and non-delegable; but the plain
words of the act preclude such an interpretation. The. intent was to make
the owner liable only if in charge of the scaffold erection. 43
After the Supreme Court had examined the statute, it concluded that
"[I]n our opinion the words of section 9 construed in the light of statu-
tory history impose a duty 'of compliance upon an; owner or other enu-
merated person having charge of the work. Any other. interpretation
would do violence to the act by deleting from it an integral phrase and
by substituting the word 'and' for 'or.' ,,4 The act therefore must-,neces-
sarily be construed with the qualifying phrase "having charge of" in-
cluded... . . ,
The Gannon court did not expressly overrule the Kennerly, case, but
did declare it to be erroneous in so far as it indicated, that the owner is
liable irrespective of control. It should be noted that Gannon.is authority
only as to the liability, of owners under section 9. . . :... :
Dispelling any fears that'the Scaffold Act had been repealed as a civil
remedy by this decision, the court said: that any employee injured -by. a
wilful violation of the act, by :any one of the. persons enumerated in sec+
tion 9 having charge of the structural work, still, has an action against
such person. 45 Whether the' owner or other person can be deemed to'be
in charge of the construction within the meaning of the act is a question
of fact for a jury, under proper instructions, to determine.46  "...,:'p
Thus in order to 'recover from an owner, the plaintiff, in a case brought
under the Scaffold Act must allege and prove that the: owner had,' charge
of the work.
While recognizing that no one has a vested rightin any decision,47 tie
court remanded the case because the plaintiff, in reliance on ambiguous
decisions, suffered a hardship. The case will be retried in the light of the
interpretation of the act as set forth in' the Gannon case.
The dissenting opinion 48 written by Mr. Justice Hershey, with Chief
Justice Schaefer concurring, maintains that because the legislature did-not
act on proposed amendments to the act in' 1959, this expressed. approval
of the construction given the act by the decision in Kennerly in 1958,
and therefore Kennerly should be upheld. The' 'ajority rejected this
43 Liability without fault was 'not' favored in the law at tAe time of passage of this
act. See, Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 22 Ill.2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
44Id. at 321, 175 N.E.2d at 793.
45 Gundich v. Emerson Comstock Co., 21 I1.2d 117., 171 NE.2d 60 (1960); Fetter-
man v. Production Steel Co., 4 111. App.2d 403, 124 N.E.2d 637 (1954).




arghment :stating that -action or inaction by the legislature, in 1959 is not
indicative of legislative intent in 1907.1 9
The interpretation of the act as set forth in Gannon has been followed
by- the court in Kiszkan v. The Texas Co'-.5 decided in the same term.
The owner-of the property in that case wag,a lessor and not in possession
ff the :premises. The plaintiff, .a workman employed by an independent
contractor pursuant to a -contract between the contractor and the lessee,
was injured in, a fall from a scaffold. Suit was brought against the lessor-
owner.. At the trial, the lessor was granted-'a summary judgment on the
grounds that it was- not in charge of the work, was not consulted about it
and ,was not a party to the contract. Ho1ding,,that the lessor was a mere
title holder out of possession and therefore notan owner within the mean-
ing of section 9 of the act, the Appellate Court affirmed.
',:.Rejecting the Appellate Court's ratio decidendi and relying instead on
the reasoning 'employed in the .Gannon case, the Supreme Court in affirm-
ing held: "the criterion, according to the plain words of the statute, is
not whether the owner is in or out of possession, but whether the owner
has-charge, of the construction, erection, et cetera, of the designated struc-ture. 'This is the standard imposed by the statute. ..
'49 Ibid.
'.5:0 22 IIl.2d 326, 175 N.E.2d.401 (1961)
51 Id. at 329, 175 N.E.2d at 403.
TORTS-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL
SUFFERING: A NEW TORT IN ILLINOIS
Pl.intiff brought. a civil suit against the convicted murderer of her
Iusband. In her complaint, she alleged that 'the defendant's threat to. kill
her husband together with the fulfillment of. that, threat caused her to
suffer great mental anguish. and nervous exhaustion. It was not alleged
that any 'physical injury resulted. The trial court held that no cause of
'action Was 'stated. The plaintiff appealed directly 'to the Illinois Supreme
Court.1 The Court, after analyzing and evaluating the traditional ration-
'alizations for the refusal to recognize intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a separate tort, concluded that peace of mind is an interest of
sufficient importance to. receive the protection of the law from flagrant,
unreasonable acts of this type. The Supreme Court, in reversing the trial
court, stated that an unwarranted intrusion intended to cause severe emo-
' The constitutionality of the Dram Shop Act, ILL. REV, STAT. ch. 43 §§ 131-35 (1959)
was involved, therefore an appeal directly to the Supreme Court was allowed. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 110 S 75 (1959). " .
